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Abstract: 
This  paper  investigates  spatial  spillovers  in  local  spending  decisions 
between  the  center  and  the  surrounding  local  communities  by  using 
panel  data  of  the  canton  of  Lucerne  during  the  1990s.  Due  to  the 
geographical  fragmentation  with  a  major  central  city  and  some  100 
small  suburban  local  communities  within  a  distance  from  4  to  55 
kilometers  to  the  center  this  area  represents  a  particularly  useful 
database in order to test the relevance of spatial interactions in a small 
metropolitan  area.  The  empirical  evidence  confirms  strategic 
interactions among suburban governments and the central city only for 
public  education,  health  and  environmental  spending.  There  are  no 
spatial  interactions  with  the  central  city  for  overall  government 
spending.   
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1.  Introduction 
Metropolitan  areas  are  often  characterized  by  a  declining  central  city  while  the 
surrounding  suburbs  enjoy  an  increase  in  prosperity.  The  social  and  economic 
problems encountered with this asymmetry are widely debated both in policy and 
research. The provision and maintenance of central city infrastructure such as higher 
education,  traffic,  public  health,  public  security  or  cultural  facilities  require  high 
government revenue for the central city. At the same time, the tax bases in central 
cities are sensitive to high tax burdens. People react to tax incentives and move from 
the center to nearby local communities where the tax burden is lower. As long as the 
exclusion of commuters from the consuming of public goods provided by the central 
city is costly or impossible, there is an incentive to migrate to the suburban  local 
communities,  especially  for  people  of  the  upper-  and  middle  class.  This  lack  of 
equivalence  between  income  taxation  and  the  perceived  benefits  is  a  source  of 
inefficiency. City governments are confronted with a concentration of poverty in the 
center and declining relative incomes while the suburban jurisdictions enjoy a higher 
standard of living with relatively low taxes.  
Clearly, cities and suburbs are not independent from each other (Houghwout, 1999). 
Local  incumbents  do  not  take  policy  decisions  in  isolation.  The  effect  of  one 
jurisdiction‟s  spending  decisions  on  residents  of  other  jurisdictions  has  budgetary 
consequences  for  both  jurisdictions.  Hence,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  adequate 
territorial  structure of  metropolitan areas  has  been a frequently discussed issue in 
urban economics and politics for many years. The emphasis of this paper is on spatial 




there  a strategic interaction  among  small metropolitan governments  due to  spatial 
benefit spillovers from the central city to their suburbs? 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the main argument on spatial 
spillovers and strategic interactions between governments within a metropolitan area. 
Section three contains stylized facts on the data set used for empirical implementation. 
The empirical investigation appears in section four followed by conclusions in section 
five.  
2.  Spatial interactions in metropolitan areas  
Exploring spatial interactions within a metropolitan area is of importance for policy 
for several reasons. Like the Swiss population, the inhabitants of many other nations 
are urban to an overwhelming and increasing extent.
1 In addition, metropolitan areas 
are considered as the “engine” of the nation‟s economy (Frey, 1990). Central cities 
provide unique agglomeration economies, which define an important and specialized 
role of the city in the metropolitan economy (Ihlanfeldt, 1995). Such agglomeration 
economies  arise  from  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  the  production  of  goods  and 
services, cumulative advantages from the growth of industry, developments of skills 
and know-how, easy communication of ideas and experiences and opportunities of 
ever-increasing differentiation and specialization of human activities (Kaldor, 1970). 
Agglomeration  economies  can  be  of  two  types:  localization  economies  and 
urbanization economies. Localization economies evolve from the closeness of firms 
so that a particular industry within the same area can achieve scale economies.  In 
contrast, urbanization economies generate benefits for all firms through the diverse, 
but complementary economic activity of an area.  
                                                   




Since  urban  density  influences  agglomeration  economies  positively,  a  firm‟s  total 
factor productivity is significantly higher in central cities than in smaller local local 
communities.
2 Nevertheless, factor payments to commuters establish a link between 
central  city  and  suburban  economic  growth.  Therefore,  through  various 
complementary and interdependent activities with the suburban area a healthy central 
city increases the standard of living of the whole metropolitan cluster.
3  
However, concentration of economic activity in central cities is often accompanied by 
socio-demographic problems. Disadvantages of urban agglomeration (e.g. increasing 
crime rate, pollution, or congestion) are mainly felt  in the central city. Moreover, 
central cities provide a wide range of services which are partly used by citizens living 
and paying taxes in suburban areas. If they act as “free-riders”, the central city carries 
the  burden  of  providing  services  used  by  commuters.  This  leads  to  continuous 
financial  erosion,  as  higher  taxes  support  the  flight  of  the  upper  social-class  into 
suburban jurisdictions, while the socially weak population is left in the central city. If 
the  poor  vote  for  additional  redistribution  in  the  central  city,  this  accelerates  the 
cumulative process (Brueckner, 1983). 
Due to the mismatch of spending claims and revenue capacity, central cities have 
insufficient resources for undertaking infrastructure projects and granting tax relief. In 
this situation, urban fragmentation will result in an undersupply of public policies 
designed to promote economic growth for the metropolitan area as a whole. If the 
nation‟s standard of living depends on healthy engines, then the whole economy may 
be negatively affected by the financial decline of central cities. In this logic, it may be 
                                                   
2 Both localization economies and urbanization economies increase the productivity of firms located in 
highly  populated  urban  areas  (Ciccone  and  Hall,  1996).  However,  according  to  an  empirical 
investigation by  Feldman and Audretsch (1999) diversity among complementary activities is  more 
important for innovations.  
3 Results from empirical research show that urban growth is much more a stimulus for  rural areas than 




reasonable to engage in central cities while simultaneously making residents of the 
whole metropolitan area better off (Voith, 1992). 
To the extent that voluntary agreements among metropolitan governments can address 
the problems of the central city they may enhance the efficiency of a nation‟s fiscal 
policy as a whole. At any rate, according to Cooter (1982), Inman and Rubinfeld 
(1997) or Voith (1998), the process of suburbanization and the consequent decline of 
central  cities  seem  not  to  support  the  idea  that  voluntary  agreements  address  the 
problems of central cities effectively. Hence, if voluntary agreements fail, there is a 
danger of a vicious circle undermining the financial capacity of the central city (Frey, 
1985,  1996).  In  order  to  prevent  such  a  development  some  authors  argue  for  a 
coherent policy for the metropolitan region as a whole. For example, Lowery (2000, 
p. 65) states that “the lowest level at which (…) policies might be provided (...) is the 
metropolitan area”.  
Nevertheless,  the  interpretation  of  fiscal  interactions  in  metropolitan  areas  as  an 
exploitation of central cities by the suburban local communities is disputed. Baldwin 
and Krugman (2000) argue that agglomerative forces constitute a certain monopolistic 
advantage  for  the  advanced  “core”  toward  the  less  advanced  “periphery”.  In  our 
context, this implies that central cities do not only carry the burden of regional tasks, 
but also have profound advantages. Services industries with high economic capacities 
of value creation are mainly concentrated in the central city. Consequently, the central 
city benefits from corporate taxes and taxes of firm properties most. Central cities 
often have a strong local tax base. Such advantages in the tax base allow central cities 
to provide infrastructure with benefits for the whole metropolitan area. Contrarily, the 
suburban local communities do not have these advantages, so that they are forced to 




advantages. Thus, integration or harmonization of the whole metropolitan area would 
prevent metropolitan jurisdictions from concentrating on their own advantages and 
may have harmful effects for both the city and the suburbs.  
Obviously, the intensity of spatial  benefit  spillovers  depends  on how  local  public 
goods are financed. The structure of a central city‟s budget revenues typically consists 
of  local  taxes,  fees,  intergovernmental  transfers  and  revenues  from  local  activity. 
Transfers as well as fees compensate the main unit for central place functions. In the 
case of user fees, commuters do not hamper the central city‟s financial capacity, as 
long as payments coincide with marginal costs. Moreover, under the condition of a U-
shaped average costs curve and an optimal size of the public facility‟s commuter belt, 
additional user fees created by suburbanites cover fixed costs. Hence, in some cases, 
commuters enhance the financial capacity of the central city. This implies that the 
intensity of spatial spillovers depends on existing tax arrangements.  
Which of these arguments are valid for metropolitan areas? Empirical investigations 
regarding  urban  sprawl  are  largely  lacking.  However,  a  considerable  amount  of 
analyses have been devoted to spatial patterns of government spending on the local 
level. An overview of the empirical work has been provided by Brueckner (2003). 
One strand of the literature focuses on the question of “tax mimicking” of neighboring 
local  communities.  According  to  Brueckner  and  Saavedra  (2001),  Heyndels  and 
Vuchelen (1998), Buettner (2001) or Revelli (2001) local tax policy decisions in many 
countries are significantly influenced by the neighboring tax-setting policy. There is 
also evidence for budget-spillovers among neighboring US-states (Case, Rosen and 
Hines, 1993) and even for a spatial interdependence of the voting behavior (Besley 
and Case, 1995): Since voters use the policy performance of neighboring incumbents 




“yardstick competition”. Werck, Heyndels and Geys (2008) use a similar approach to 
evaluate  spillover  effects  of  cultural  spending  for  the  Flemish  local  governments. 
They define central places of the cultural life and evaluate the free-riding behavior of 
smaller municipalities surrounding the central places. Their results show that small 
municipalities  that  border  to  central  places  tend  to  disregard  what  their  smaller 
neighbors  do,  and  thus  a  free-riding  effect  could  compensate  a  positive  spatial 
interdependence.  
Our paper, in  contrast,  considerably differs from  the previously mentioned papers 
since we are not interested in neighborhood effects but in the free-riding behavior of 
all suburban communities from one central city. Thus, if free-riding on the central city 
public goods is a significant behavior of suburban policy decisions, we would expect 
a negative correlation between spending decisions of the center as compared to the 
peripheric communities. Since free-riding is easier for municipalities that are close to 
the center than those that are far from the centre, distance to the center plays a role.  
For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  we  will  evaluate  the  relevance  of  spatial  benefit 
spillovers from the center to the peripheric communities for a small metropolitan area, 
located in Lucerne, Switzerland. It represents an ideal research field as one could 
suppose that inter-jurisdictional spillovers are of great importance in the metropolitan 
area of Lucerne.
4 This assumption can be justified by the spatial organization of the 
metropolitan agglomeration (for details see section 3). Despite the high density, the 
urban space is segmented into the Lucerne central city  and thirteen  suburbs of 
different size within the canton of Lucerne, which do not take responsibility for a 
wider scope of regional functions. Owing to the local fiscal autonomy, there is no 
                                                   
4 The Zurich metropolitan area represents another natural laboratory for investigating spatial spillovers. 
In an early study, Kesselring (1979) estimates the creation of the central city benefit spillovers for the 




automatic mechanism allowing for compensation of central city functions. Thus, with 
one major central city located in a highly fragmented metropolitan area, this region 
represents a useful data base to investigate the empirical relevance of spatial benefit 
spillovers.  
3.  Stylized facts on the Lucerne urban area 
In  the  current  political  context  of  Switzerland,  the  spatial  organization  of  urban 
agglomerations is an important subject. In order to strengthen the competitiveness of 
urban areas the federal government initiated a development program in 2001. Efforts 
in building appropriate metropolitan structures also take place at lower governmental 
levels  (the  cantons).  The  canton  of  Lucerne  is  a  typical  example.  In  2002,  the 
authorities  of  the  central  city  (City  of  Lucerne)  and  the  suburban  municipalities 
passed  a  development  plan,  which  contains  objectives  regarding  a  coherent 
metropolitan public policy in different fields.
5  
Although incumbents of the urban local communities reached an agreement with the 
central city, changes in the territorial structure are still controversially discussed. 
While most local communities prefer maintaining their autonomy, the central city 
government as well as the superior cantonal government argue in favor of territorial 
consolidation. According to the central city authority, larger scale jurisdictions would 
support  a  c oherent  planning  of  the  whole  urban  area,  making  it  easier  to  find 
appropriate cost-sharing arrangements. Hence, according to their view the existing 
spatial division of the canton‟s 326‟268 inhabitants into 107 municipalities hampers 
economic growth. The average size of the Lucerne local communities is 3026 citizens. 
89% of the local governments consist of fewer than 5‟000 citizens, 6.3% of all local 
                                                   





communities have between 5‟000 and 10‟000 inhabitants. Large units (over 10‟000 
citizens) constitute only 4.7% of all local governments (our calculations according to 
Statistical Yearbook of the Canton of Lucerne 2003, p. 52). In comparison to the 
second  largest  commune,  the  central  city  has  twice  as  many  residents  (Statistical 
Yearbook of the Canton of Lucerne 2003, p. 52). 






There is not only considerable variation in the size of local communities but also in 
population density. The highest concentration of inhabitants is situated in the southern 
part of the canton (see Figure 1). 44.5% of the canton‟s inhabitants live in and near 
Lucerne. The urban space is segmented into the central city (57‟435 citizens), five 
suburban cities (11-24‟000 inhabitants), five mid-sized municipalities (3‟500-6‟000 
citizens)  and  three  smaller  units  (340-1‟300  inhabitants).  The  rest  of  the  cantonal 
territory contains  medium-sized  local  communities and small villages.  The largest 
concentration of small local units can be found in the northwestern, northeastern and 




canton. For a better overview, we have only represented local communities of the 
metropolitan area and regional centers outside the urban space. 
Independent of the size of the local communities, local authorities enjoy considerable 
autonomy in deciding, fulfilling and financing their tasks.
6 Local governments are 
responsible  for  the  provision  as  well  as  for  the  financing  of  local  services 
(administration,  public  order,  social  security,  environmental  issues,  social  care, 
education, public utilities, etc.).
7 They fund their financial needs primarily through 
local taxes and fees, transfers of the cantonal budget and  revenues  of property 
ownership.  
According to the State Development Plan
8, the Lucerne central city serves as the 
major place of economic, social, and cultural life and offers public infrastructure not 
only for itself, but also for the whole canton.
9  It is supposed that the main city 
produces considerable external benefits for the region as a whole in the fields of 
theatre,  music,  m useums  and  secondary  schools.  Moreover,  the  use  of  public 
institutions  by  inhabitants  of  the  canton  and  the  commuter  traffic  both  need 
transportation infrastructure, whose costs are partly taken over by the central city.  
Another often mentioned problem of the Lucerne central city consists in the flight of 
residents to the suburbs. Since 1970 the population of the central city has decreased 
from 69‟879 to 57‟275 inhabitants (Statistical Yearbook of Lucerne City 2003, p. 35). 
As some public services are affected by indivisibility and fixed costs, the total costs of 
                                                   
6 In economic literature, the idea of local financial autonomy has at least two meanings. One the one 
hand,  it  implies  the  degree  to  which  municipalities  are  able  to  generate,  through  local  taxes  and 
charges,  revenue  they  can  directly  control.  On  the  other  hand,  financial  autonomy  expresses  the 
assignment of functions and responsibilities to local governments in the areas of fiscal and financial 
management and planning and implementation of investment programs. For an overview of different 
aspects of financial autonomy see Dafflon and Perritaz (2000). 
7 However, levels and standards determined by the canton limit the autonomy of the municipalities. 
8 See “Richtplan für den Kanton Luzern”, Luzern 1998, (http://www.lu.ch/richtplan98/s1_1.html). 
9 Outside the urban space, eight regional centers fulfil functions on a lower scale for surrounding local 




public  production  have  not  decreased  equally  with  the  population.
10  The smaller 
number of inhabitants is accompanied by a decline in the working age population and 
an increase of elderly inhabitants. Therefore, the flight to the suburbs undermines the 
financial capacity of the central city and increases the intensity of external benefits 
produced by the central city. The authorities of the central city estimated the costs of 
providing central public services at 92 million CHF in 1998 (Merki, 2002, p. 14). In 
this context, it is argued that 34 million CHF of this sum are due to non -local 
residents,  corresponding  with  7.1%  of  central  city  expenditures  (our  calculation 
according to the Statistical Yearbook of Lucerne City 2003, p. 274). As a result of 
further negotiations, the cantonal government increased vertical grants for specific 
central city services in the following years. The canton also succeeded in taking over 
responsibility for some higher-level schools from the central city in 2002. It is argued 
that these arrangements managed to reduce the benefit spillovers to the suburban local 
communities by approximately one half (Merki, 2002, p. 14). Moreover, the renewed 
system  of  fiscal  equalization  aim s  to  compensate  the  central  city  for  urban 
agglomeration costs. 
4.  Empirical investigation 
In order to test for the presence of spatial interactions in the Lucerne metropolitan 
area, the following equation is estimated.
11 In equation 1, the index i refers to the local 
communities within the territory of the canton of Lucerne (i = 1,…, 107), and the 
index t refers to the fiscal year (t = 1992,…, 2001). eit represents the public spending 
decision by a commune i in year t.  
  eit =  wejt + Xit  + tdt + cdi +  it.  (1) 
                                                   
10 Similar observations in the US context are made by Ladd (1994).  




 and   are unknown parameters and  it is an error term. Xit is a matrix of explanatory 
variables specific to commune i in year t. It includes the population size, the 
unemployment ratio, the geographical size, the population density, the share of 
foreign residents, the share of inhabitants with age below 20, the share of inhabitants 
with age over 65, the altitude, the presence of a local parliament, the size of the local 
cabinet and the fiscal capacity. tdt represents a set of 10 fixed time-dummies in order 
to control for time-specific effects common to all local communities in a given year 
(e.g. business cycles). Finally, cdi is a set of 107 fixed communal dummies in order to 
control for community-specific effects.  
In our case parameter   is of interest. It measures the spillover effects between the city 
of Lucerne (the center) and the other local communities in the metropolitan area. w 
reflects a vector with spatial weights. These weights indicate the relevance of the 
center‟s spending decision (commune j) for commune i‟s policy formulation. In our 
case the weights capture the location (geographical distance) of commune i relative to 
the center. In the case of the center, weights capture the average distance to the other 
local communities. Hence, we assume symmetric reaction functions of the communes 
with the center. In contrast, one could argue that the center acts as the Stackelberg-
Leader. In this case, the center would not care about the reaction of nearby 
communities when formulating own policy changes. We would therefore have to 
exclude the policy decisions of communes in the reaction function of the center. 
However, casual observation does not support the notion of such a game. Many city 
governments try to persuade neighboring communities in contributing to the costs for 
new infrastructure programs within the city. Depending on the result of negotiations, 




many investment projects of the city of Lucerne.
12 In addition, low migration costs 
within the urban area of Lucerne compel the central city authority to adjust the 
tax/service package if nearby communities improve their attractiveness. Thus, we 
assume the government of the central city not to take policy decisions in isolation and 
consequently not to act as a Stackelberg-Leader. 
As known from the literature on spatial econometrics, three major issues must be 
addressed when estimating equation (1).
13 According to Brueckner (2003, p. 183) 
these are (1) endogeneity of the ejs, (2) possible spatial error dependence and (3) 
possible correlation between Xi and the error term.  
First, the spending decisions of the neighboring areas on the right-hand side of 
equation (1) are endogenous, due to the fact that the spending decisions of the center 
and of the neighboring areas are determined simultaneously. In order to tackle 
endogeneity problems, which cause biased OLS estimates, some authors use an 
instrumental variables (IV) method.
14 This approach has been successfully 
implemented by Ladd (1992), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995), 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), Revelli (2001) and Büttner (2001). However, the 
focus of their analyses is not on the empirical relevance of spatial benefit spillovers 
from the central city to the suburbs but on tax mimicking between neighboring 
jurisdictions or on spillovers from public sector capital on private sector production. 
Under this approach they regress wejt on Xit and wXit. The fitted values w ˆ ejt are then 
used as instruments for wejt. The IV approach yields consistent parameter estimates. A 
further approach is to assume that spatial interactions occur with a time lag. Thus, the 
                                                   
12 The most recent project financed from funds of the central city and the surrounding municipalities is 
the ice-rink “Swiss life arena”. Discussions between the central city and the suburbs regarding the 
construction of a new indoor swimming pool for the whole region are under way. 
13 A review on spatial econometrics is given by Anselin (1988).  
14 Another approach in estimating spatial interactions consistently is to use a maximum likelihood 
(ML) method, which has been applied by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) or Brueckner and Saavedra 




ejt values of the right-hand side of equation (1) require a temporal delay for one or 
more periods. Eliminating simultaneity, OLS estimates yield consistent coefficient 
values (Brueckner, 2003, p. 184). In our case, the Wu-Hausman test confirms 
endogeneity of the ejs with a value of 18.9 for the F-test. Nevertheless, we do not use 
IV estimates due to the problem of suitable instruments. Instead, we use panel data, 
where all time-invariant community characteristics, observed or unobserved, are 
represented by community-specific intercepts (Brueckner, 2003).   
Second, spatial dependence in the error  it arises due to omitted variables that are 
themselves spatially dependent (Brueckner, 2003, p. 184). Often, topographical 
features are spatially correlated since they are likely to be unmeasured. Ignoring 
spatial dependence in the error term causes biased parameter estimates. Several 
methods to deal with spatial dependence exist. An easy solution to attain unbiased 
estimates is to use the IV approach discussed above or again to rely on panel data 
fixed-effects to eliminate spatial error dependence.  
Third, unobserved communal characteristics in Xit may be correlated with the error 
term (Brueckner, 2003, p. 185). If data on communal characteristics are lacking, one 
suitable remedy is to rely on panel data, leaving all time-invariant communal 
characteristics to the communal-specific intercept. However, using communal fixed-
effects has the drawback of hiding the information of time-invariant variables in Xit 
while rendering the estimated coefficients insignificant. In the following, we display 
results for the two-way fixed effects estimation technique.  
The data set used in the empirical analysis consists of data collected by the cantonal 
statistical office in Lucerne. The data set covers per capita public spending for all 
spending items of all 107 local communities within the canton of Lucerne over the 




includes a number of socio-demographic variables (population, population density, 
residents under the age of 20 as well as residents above the age 65, unemployment, 
foreign residents) as well as variables reflecting the communal budget constraint 
(financial capacity) (see Appendix 1).
15  
Figure 2 shows the average public spending of all 107 local communities with respect 
to their distance to the center. Obviously, with an average amount of more than 7000 
CHF per capita the center has extraordinarily high per capita spending while most of 
the other local communities average around 4000 CHF per capita. For overall public 
spending there is hardly any other spatial pattern observable in Figure 2.  
The estimation results for general expenditure are presented in Table 1. Column 1 
displays time and community fixed-effects estimates for all 107 communities in 
Lucerne. Column 2 shows the same equations where we dropped the observations for 
the city of Lucerne, the central city. In our context, the spatial spillover variable is of 
interest.  
   
                                                   
15 Since the cantonal statistical office does not provide income data for the single local communities we 
use a proxy of the local financial strength, which is used for the inter-communal fiscal equalization 




Figure 2: Per capita local public spending and distance from the center in km., 107 
local communities, 1992-2001, mean values 
 
The  results  show  that  overall  horizontal  fiscal  interactions  between  the  local 
communities and the center in the Lucerne metropolitan area are not of importance on 
a  convenient  level  of  significance.  In  column  1  the  spillover  coefficient  is 
approximately 1.1 with  a t-value of 1.83. This implies that an overall increase of 
public spending in the center has a slightly positive and significant impact on the 
expenditure decisions of neighboring local communities in the Lucerne metropolitan 
area. Hence, the hypothesis that surrounding  communities free-ride on  the central 
city‟s public goods in the Lucerne metropolitan can be rejected in the case for general 
spending.  In  contrast,  there  rather  seems  to  be  a  mimicking  of  spending  patterns 
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Table 1: General Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 
1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  32.45  31.71 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-
2001. All financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 
 
However, spatial spillover effects for general expenditure do not provide information 
as to whether any specific kind of public task creates spatial spillovers between the 




which category of public spending spills out to neighboring jurisdictions in order to 
implement cost-sharing agreements adequately.  
Appendix 2 displays the results for all spending categories of the local communities in 
the Lucerne metropolitan area. Most interestingly, the existence of spatial spillovers 
varies considerably in size and significance across the different spending items. In a 
majority of spending categories, spatial interactions between the central city and the 
peripheric municipalities do not play an important role, as in the case of 
administration, security, culture and recreation, welfare, traffic, economy and finance 
spending. However, there is an indication of an urban sprawl in some politically 
important and controversially discussed policy fields. In the case of education, health 
and environment spending, the spillover effect are significant. The estimated 
coefficients for culture and recreation with a value around –5.8 and a t-value around 
4.4 indicate that an increase of central culture and recreation spending by 1 % will be 
anticipated by the surrounding local communities with a decrease of their own culture 
and recreation spending by 5.8 %. In the case of public health spending the respective 
value is 6.5 % and for environmental spending the value accounts for 4.7 %. This 
result indicates that a cost-sharing agreement between the benefiting local 
communities and the center in the case of public education, health and environmental 
decisions may be beneficial for the region as a whole.  
For the other spending items, the spillover coefficient is small and insignificant in any 
of the estimation approaches. Thus, according to the obtained results, the Lucerne 
central city does not provide public services from which the whole metropolitan area 





5.  Policy implications 
Empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that spatial benefit spillovers from 
the  central  city  to  suburban  local  communities  do  not  play  an  important  role  for 
overall spending in the case of Lucerne, but for important specific spending in the 
fields of public education, health and environmental spending.
16 Note however, that 
these public expenditure items account for almost 50 % of all local per capita 
spending in the canton Lucerne between 1992 and 2001. Thus, it is crucial to find 
cost-saving inter-jurisdictional agreements in those policy fields which are confronted 
with spatial benefit spillovers between the center and the surrounding communities.  
  A possible approach to compensate for spillovers is seen in a special grant 
from  the  canton’s  budget  or  special  compensations  within  the  fiscal 
equalization system (Oates, 1999). With this option local units are able to keep 
their  autonomy,  while  central  government  authorities  can  enlarge  their 
influence on the political decisions of municipalities. Thus, the “matching-
grant-solution”  represents  a  politically  attractive  strategy.  However, 
democratic accountability is not granted under such a regime since vertical 
grants violate the fiscally equivalent financing of local public goods. There is 
no  direct  link  between  paying  taxes  and  receiving  public  services,  which 
creates a so-called fly-paper effect (Gramlich, 1977; Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
Hence, as empirical investigations have shown time and again, the distribution 
of  vertical  inter-governmental  grants  is  determined  politically  rather  than 
according to considerations of economic theory alone (Inman, 1988 for the US 
grant  program;  Pitlik,  Schmid  and  Schneider,  2001  for  the  German 
                                                   
16 Note that our empirical analysis does not evaluate the presence of spatial spillovers from the central 
Lucerne city to local communities outside the canton Lucerne. Some observers argue that these local 
communities benefit most from the central city. However, the integration of several local communities 




Länderfinanzausgleich  and  Borck  and  Owings,  2003  for  the  case  of 
Californian counties). Special compensations and matching grants often fail to 
internalize benefit spillovers adequately.
17  
  Horizontal  cost-sharing  agreements  represent  pragmatic  and  cost-saving 
solutions to the spillover problem. Though it is often argued that the central 
city has a weak position in the negotiations with suburban local communities, 
some  Swiss  urban  areas  have  succeeded  in  reaching  agreements  under  the 
condition that the central city was able to convincingly illustrate the excess 
burden it has  to  carry  (Frey 1979;  Pommerehne and Krebs  1991). From  a 
theoretical point of view, horizontal negotiations are especially effective since 
all  parties  have  vested  interests  in  an  agreement.  Voluntary  co-operation 
fosters  intrinsic  motivation  to  comply  with  the  agreement  (Frey  1997). 
Moreover,  both  the  local  communities  and  the  central  city  are  not  only 
motivated to fulfill the contract but also to monitor each other.
18 A common 
strategy  of  central  cities  to  enforce  an  agreement  with  the  nearby  local 
communities is the threat to tax commuters. Indeed, several US -cities levy 
taxes on non-resident  employees in an attempt to price the benefits that 
suburban commuters enjoy from the central city (Ladd and Yinger, 1991).
19  
  Voluntary co-operation of local governments in communal associations is a 
frequently  used  form  of  inter-jurisdictional  cooperation  in  many  countries. 
Communal associations permit the exploitation of economies of scale when 
joint  production  is  required.  Compared  to  the  cost-sharing  agreement,  the 
                                                   
17 As shown by Gossman, Mavros and Wassmer (1996) for US urban areas, city expenditures funded 
by vertical grants can even have a negative impact on economic growth.  
18 On the other hand, Heinz (2000) reports from experience of Western European countries where 
negotiations between the central city and the surrounding local communities did not succeed.  
19 However, the Swiss constitution doe sn‟t make possible to tax non-resident employees who daily 




communal association is a tighter single purpose co-operation often with its 
own organization. On the other hand and in contrast to municipal mergers, 
political  power  remains  within  the  local  government,  which  protects 
possibilities  of  democratic  monitoring.  Maintained  autonomy  of  local 
communities  also  enhances  political  acceptability  of  associations‟  policy 
decisions since there is always the option to withdraw from the consortium 
(Vanberg, 2001). 
However,  in  reality  communal  associations  are  confronted  with  serious 
drawbacks.  Often,  a  lack  of  transparency  concerning  the  associations‟ 
activities and their financial responsibility is claimed as well as a growing 
influence of interest groups. The shortcomings are largely the result of the 
limited  participation  possibilities  of  citizen-voters  in  the  political  decision 
making  process.
20  There is hardly any incentive for voters to monitor the 
associations‟  policies  as  long  as  possibilities  to  take  influence  are  largely 
lacking (Dafflon and Ruegg 2001, p. 28).  
  Another  proposal  for  internalizing  spatial  spillovers  concerns  territorial 
consolidation of metropolitan areas. Enlargement of municipalities allows the 
newly created unit to provide a wider range of services for the whole urban 
territory. Theoretically, a better mapping of electoral with fiscal responsibility 
can be achieved. However, as Bradford and Oates (1974) show, turning from a 
decentralized  service  provision  to  a  “unified  system”  can  lead  to  very 
substantial  efficiency  losses.  The  catchment  area  of  the  newly  created 
municipality is too big and too small at the same time. Optimal centralization 
of local governments for one public task fails to internalize urban sprawls in 
                                                   
20 The impact of direct voter participation in the political decision-making process by means of voter 




another public task. As a consequence, some inter-jurisdictional spillovers are 
internalized  by  chance,  while  new  external  effects  are  created  (Frey  and 
Eichenberger 2001).
21 
Next,  amalgamation  of  municipalities  in  urban  agglomerations  reduces 
regional diversification, erodes identification with political decisions in their 
areas of jurisdiction and hampers competition between local authorities.
22 
Thus, the efficiency enhancing effect of internalizing some external effects by 
municipal  merger  has  to  be  compared  with  the  efficiency  loss  due  to 
suboptimal  allocation  of  public  resources  and  the  decreasing  number  of 
innovations in the provision of public services . Evidence for con solidated 
urban areas in the US shows that efficiency gains from internalizing spatial 
benefit spillovers do not compensate by far for the loss of competition.
23  
Summing up, experiences with existing inter -municipal cooperation arrangements 
suggest that simple and flexible structures represent a prerequisite for their success. 
Organizational structures, financial transactions, and democratic accountability have 
to be transparent in order to establish incentives for efficient inter -jurisdictional co-
operation. This requires the stimulation of democratic control by introducing political 
participation rights to citizens (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001). Furthermore, the single 
purpose  orientation  of  co -operation  allows  for  flexible  agreements  with  varying 
partners respecting the financial and organizational autonomy of the single  commune 
                                                   
21 Another often mentioned problem of government centralization with locally elected agents consists 
in their engagement in pork barrel politics (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson, 1981).  
22 Olivier (2000) shows for US cities that civic participation is significantly negative correlated with the 
commune size. He measured civic involvement by four aspects: Contacting local officials, attending 
organizational meetings, attending commune board meetings and voting in local elections. All four 
aspects of civic life go down as the size of local units goes up. A similar analysis on the voter 
participation rate in Swiss town meetings has been provided by Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1978).  
23 Gossman, Mavros and Wassmer, (1996) show in an investigation  of 49 US local governments that 
more consolidated local government structure decreases the ability of authorities to provide local 
services efficiently and cost-effectively. For similar results see also Marlow and Joulfaian (1990) or 




(Zax,  1988).  A  frequently  discussed  approach  which  proposes  to  meet  these 
requirements  is  the  concept  of  Focj.  This  model  of  inter-municipal  co-operation 
evolved by Frey and Eichenberger (1999) is an option of providing public services 
with varying scale in urban areas.
24  
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  investigated  the  existence  and  the  intensity  of  inter-
jurisdictional spillovers in the urban area of Lucerne. With one major central city 
located in a highly fragmented metropolitan area with some 100 local communities 
with  varying  scale  and  importance  this  region  represents  a  useful  data  base  to 
investigate the empirical relevance of spatial benefit spillovers. Is there a strategic 
interaction among metropolitan governments due to spatial benefit spillovers from the 
central city to their suburbs?  
The results of our analysis provide empirical evidence that the Lucerne central city 
provides  benefit  spillovers  for  the  surrounding  local  local  communities  in  some 
important areas: public education, health and environmental spending but not for the 
overall  public  spending.  For  the  other  spending  items,  there  is  no  evidence  of 
significant  and  sizeable  spatial  spillover  effects.  Thus,  a  huge  reshaping  of  the 
territorial  organization  seems  not  to  be  an  adequate  answer  to  internalize  inter-
jurisdictional benefit spillovers, even for such a small and fragmented urban area as 
the Lucerne metropolitan area. Furthermore, vertical grants from the cantonal level to 
the city seem not to address the problem adequately. Rather a pragmatic strategy for 
government authorities of urban areas is to strengthen voluntary inter-communal co-
operations  by  single-purpose  associations  with  flexible  geographical  boundaries. 
Moreover,  promoting  and  allowing  for  voter  participation  is  a  prerequisite  for 
                                                   




attaining  and  maintaining  political  accountability  of  communal  associations.  In 
addition,  since the optimal size for various public services considerably differs,  a 
perfect mapping between the electoral and fiscal responsibility is difficult to achieve 
by territorial consolidation.  
In conclusion, though it is reasonable to assume that central cities and their suburbs do 
not  take  policy  decisions  in  isolation,  the  significance  and  importance  of  spatial 
spillovers has to be evaluated carefully. Far-reaching amalgamations in metropolitan 
areas  in  order  to  internalize  spillover  effects  can  also  involve  serious  drawbacks. 
There  are  some  good  reasons  for  maintaining  the  autonomy  of  local  local 
communities while promoting the establishment of cost-sharing agreements for each 
of those particular policy areas that are confronted with spatial spillovers. On the one 
hand,  decentralized  structures  allow  for  better  tailoring  the  public  goods  to  the 
specific needs of different constituencies. On the other hand, decentralization supports 
transparency  and  accountability  of  policy  decisions  if  accompanied  by  well-
established rights of voter participation.  
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Appendix 1: Stylized Facts on the Lucerne metropolitan area, 107 local communities, 
1992-2001, deflated to 1990.  
Variable                        |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
--------------------------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
General expenditure     overall |   4009.29   972.7397       2257       9179 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             881.2067     2584.6       7720 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             419.8034    2094.29    7704.89 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Administration          overall |  432.7636   109.8774        250        866 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             102.8694      275.5      760.2 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             39.74943   234.2636   649.7636 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Security                overall |  121.0664   54.60303         60        752 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             46.88737         80      531.6 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             28.31209   31.46636   661.4664 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Education               overall |  1487.029   439.2824        827       4954 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             395.1833     1039.1     3833.7 |     n =     107 
                        within  |              195.228    451.329   2689.829 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Culture and Recreation  overall |  55.66542   81.38602          0        662 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |              79.6713        5.4      555.9 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             18.15511  -74.23458   235.1654 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Public Health           overall |  55.19907   109.8543          4        900 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             106.4683        8.4      642.9 |     n =     107 
                        within  |              28.7732  -322.0009   328.9991 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Welfare                 overall |  605.1215   384.2838         66       2325 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             358.5775      262.2     2008.6 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             142.0517  -330.7785   1292.321 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Traffic                 overall |  131.0785   69.58514        -35        523 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             64.52196       54.4      459.8 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             26.72185   -29.9215   275.9785 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Environment             overall |  263.5477   139.2735         44       1092 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             113.8043         93      744.5 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             80.96133  -287.8523   979.9477 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Economy                 overall |  40.71963    97.2188          0       1165 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             96.43764        5.4      998.4 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             15.15172  -113.6804   207.3196 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Finance                 overall |  817.0701   442.7347         26       5259 |     N =    1070 
per capita              between |             301.3371       88.3     1754.6 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             325.5371  -408.8299    4809.17 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Population              overall |  3188.121   6641.911        164      59840 |     N =    1070 
                        between |             6668.215      177.5    58091.3 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             155.7203   1876.821   4936.821 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Unemployment            overall |  .8877477   .6960896          0        4.4 |     N =    1070 
in percent              between |             .4792705       .225      2.777 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             .5067291  -.8672523   2.882748 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Population density      overall |  298.2983   437.8325      15.93    3789.74 |     N =    1070 
                        between |             439.4252     16.259   3678.995 |     n =     107 
                        within  |              15.1143   193.1113   409.0433 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Foreign residents       overall |   9.20583   6.690247          0   65.39116 |     N =    1070 
in percent              between |             6.331515   .4755158   30.48332 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             2.238041  -9.173495   53.28954 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Population < age of 20  overall |  31.66664   72.70743        4.4       41.5 |     N =    1070 
in percent              between |             22.72509      17.11      37.41 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             1.577331   2.801449   38.73145 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Population > age of 65  overall |  12.26804   5.414743        2.5       65.3 |     N =    1070 
in percent              between |             3.233265          4      22.39 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             4.353557  -1.301963   62.04804 |     T =      10 
                                |                                            | 
Financial strength      overall |  77.27009   31.39922         25        395 |     N =    1070 
                        between |             30.43614       29.3      294.8 |     n =     107 
                        within  |             8.206793   23.47009   177.4701 |     T =      10 




Appendix 2: Spatial benefit spillovers for all spending items in the Lucerne 
metropolitan area, 107 local communities, 1992-2001, deflated to 1990.  
Education Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  107.62  109.17 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Traffic Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  8.79  8.72 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Security Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  4.43  4.54 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Administration Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  48.04  47.49 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Culture and Recreation Government  Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton  of Lucerne), 
1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  8.91  8.83 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Health Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  8.47  8.72 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Welfare Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  99.52  100.07 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Environment Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  29.49  29.29 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Economy Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  3.55  3.69 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 




Finance Government Spending, 107 Swiss local Communities (canton of Lucerne), 1992-2001  
  All communities  All communities without central city 
































Observations  1070  1060 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
F-Test  9.94  10.31 
Notes: dependent variable is per capita public spending for 107 local communities over 1992-2001. All 
financial data are deflated to the year 1990 
 